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Older adults access critical resources online,
including bank, retirement, and health insurance
accounts. Thus, it is necessary to protect their
accounts so they can confidently use these services
that are increasingly being moved online. Two-factor
authentication (2FA) protects online assets through
efficient and robust authentication, but adoption
and usability remain a challenge. Our in-depth
qualitative research focuses on ten older adults’ (≥
60 years) sustained (non)usage of 2FA for thirty
days. Participants’ limited adoption of the security
keys stemmed from keys’ non-inclusive design, lack of
tangible benefits, inconsistent instructions, and device
dependencies. We propose appropriate assistance,
risk communication, registration process changes,
and alignment of security-focused requirements to
encourage 2FA adoption among older adults and
institutions entrusted with their data. We also
introduce the concept of ‘Security Caregivers,’ who can
ensure security and digital independence for the aging
population.
1. Introduction
By 2030, more than 20% of the US population will
be 65 years old or older [1], and by 2050, nearly 17%
of the world population will consist of older adults [2].
Additionally, older adults have increased their use of
the Internet and everyday digital devices [3]. However,
while many digital tools and equipment for older adults
are being developed, the rate of adoption is low despite
the potential benefits [4]. Additionally, security threats
are inherently bundled with those convenience benefits,
and older adults are disproportionately targeted [5].
Older adults’ risk perception differs significantly
from non-older adult populations in digital and physical
domains (e.g., [6, 7]). To provide better and more
effective solutions, we investigated the usability of
hardware security tokens for older adults (≥ 60 years).
To understand the challenges they encountered with 2FA
tools, we studied their experiences with registering and
using a hardware token (Figure 1) by implementing
Figure 1. Security Key by Yubico that supports U2F
and FIDO2
a think-aloud protocol, surveys, and a semi-structured
interview. We also captured their ongoing usage
experience by conducting a follow-up survey (one
month after the original experiment). We particularly
examine the following research questions:
1. What factors contribute to older adults’ negative
perception/non-adoption of 2FA?
2. What factors could facilitate adoption of 2FA by
older adults?
To answer this, we focused on older adults’ perceptions
of risks related to online identity security, their
immediate response to 2FA functionality and usage,
2FA design flaws contributing to non-adoption by
older adults, the typical pain points that older adults
experience as they try to use 2FA, and the technical
expertise/cognitive plasticity older adults might need
in using 2FA. Our investigation of 2FA tokens
found that non-inclusive design and inadequate risk
communication resulted in minimal adoption by our
older adult participants.
2. Authentication
Authentication is the verification of identity that
proves the right to access an asset or service [8].
Traditionally, authentication has three possible factors:
what someone knows, what someone has, and
what someone is. These correspond to passwords
and personal identification numbers (PINs), physical
devices, and biometrics, respectively. Passwords are the
most widely used authentication method, though they
have been proven to be vulnerable to a wide range of
attacks [9, 10]. As a solution, two-factor authentication
technologies provide an additional method for identity
verification beyond the factor of “what someone
knows,” (i.e. password) to improve data security [11].






Usability of 2FA has been found to be challenging
by many security practitioners and researchers. Das
et al., for instance, noted several usability issues with
the Yubico Security Key and 2FA in general, where a
lack of motivation to use the tools, along with users’
confidence in their ‘strong’ password strategies, were
cited as primary reasons for non-adoption [12]. Their
study showed that improvement in website design and
clarity of instructions significantly improved the user
experience of their participants. Here, we summarize
similar works.
3.1. User Experience Issues with 2FA
Security tools often have usability and accessibility
limitations. These can be exacerbated by a lack
of user-friendly terminology or appropriate visual
cues [13]. Research has illustrated that misaligned
risk perception and usability issues result in negative
experiences with 2FA tools and technologies [12, 14,
15, 16, 17]. For example, Braz et al. pointed out
that straightforward changes in an interface’s design
will impact users’ overall experience with 2FA [18].
Reynolds et al. studied the Yubico Security Key,
focusing on 2FA usability with desktop and web
applications. They identified significant user failures
in a majority of U2F applications, specifically during
the on-boarding (also called enrollment or setup)
procedures [19]. Colnago et al. studied the user
experience of 2FA among university students and
suggested implementation improvements for improving
user adoption [20]. In addition to ease of enrollment and
usability, researchers have identified how 2FA solutions
can impinge self-efficacy and hinder instrumental
activities of daily living [21]. These studies have
been helpful in understanding the user perspective on
2FA tools; however, they have mostly focused on
convenience samples.
3.2. Challenges of IT Adoption
Prior research has investigated the adoption
(acceptance and diffusion [22]) of new technologies (or
lack thereof) among the general population [23]. Davis
described two characteristics of a technical innovation
that could predict its adoption among users: perceived
ease of use and perceived usefulness [24]. When it
comes to technology adoption among older adults, the
perceived usability of the tool is particularly critical.
Barnard et al. noted that older adults are open to
learning new technology when the “learning pains” are
not overwhelming and that the social environment the
adult is in plays an important role in encouraging or
discouraging this learning [25].
3.3. Varied Risk Perception
Users may have differing perceptions of similar
online threats; thus, it is critical to study diverse
populations [26, 27]. However, a majority of human
subject studies in computer security have focused on
convenience samples of university students, often in
computer science [28]. Research has shown that risk
perception for security and privacy is a function of age,
technical expertise, and other demographics which are
not necessarily represented among computer science
students [29, 30]. For example, a 2017 study showed
a correlation between security knowledge and security
behavior from a study of 898 participants and their
security practices [30]. Also, examinations of browser
use have illustrated that expertise level is a strong
determinant of security usage patterns [29].
3.4. Authentication Security for Older Adults
Supporting older adults’ authentication security is
a relatively unexplored arena, but human-computer
interaction (HCI) security researchers have shown
strategies that are effective for older adults. Fisk et
al. focused on designing various technologies for older
adults, where the learning curve is often greater due to
the shift in cognitive ability as people age [31]. Older
adults’ cognitive capabilities change over time, making
some security strengthening methods challenging [32,
33, 34]. Researchers have turned to methods such
as graphical passwords to more specifically support
them [35, 36]. Nicholson et al. found that younger
participants performed better than older adults when
using picture-based passwords, but the older adults
performed significantly better when the pictures used
age-appropriate faces [36]. Another challenge for
older adults is that they may be less experienced with
online risks, making them potentially more susceptible
unless we use age-appropriate risk communication
strategies [7, 37]. We sought to better support older
adults’ online security by studying their use of 2FA. Our
study and analysis aids in understanding the everyday
online authentication practices of older adults to better
develop and design personalized security tools with an
under-studied population in mind.
4. Methods
We recruited ten participants through snowball
sampling by advertising through flyers and
word-of-mouth. The subjects were required to (i)
be at least 60 years old, (ii) have a personal mobile
phone/tablet/laptop, and (iii) have a personal or work
email or social media account. The participants who did
not have any experience with computers or digital media
of any kind could not participate in the study, since we
evaluated the user experience with a hardware-based
account authentication tool. Once selected, participants
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filled out an online pre-survey, where they were asked
questions about their computer and security expertise
to identify the technology proficiency of the subject
pool. The expertise questions were based on previous
research by Rajivan et al., who asked questions about
user computer and security experiences to a sample of
890 participants [30]. After the pre-survey, an in-person
think-aloud protocol was conducted. Every participant
was provided with the YubiKey and asked to register
the key with their personal Gmail or social media
account. We selected the Yubico Security Key, given
that it is one of the most widely used and implemented
hardware-based security tokens [38]. The hardware
token we choose was a Fast IDentity Online (FIDO)1
Universal 2nd Factor (U2F) Security Key.
We first asked participants to set up the key with their
online accounts, including email or social media. Four
participants set it up with their Gmail account and one
with their work email. Five participants did not have an
email account that supported 2FA or did not want to set
it up on their email, so they registered it with a social
media account. Four of those five participants set it up
with Facebook, and one chose Twitter since they did not
want to share a required personal phone number with
Facebook. During the setup procedure, we implemented
the think-aloud protocol [39].
No guidance was given to participants by the
interviewer during setup unless help was explicitly
requested. All participants were given setup instructions
available on the Yubico website2. Specific instructions
for Google/Facebook/Twitter integration were provided
in the application list. The participant who used their
work account used the instructions provided by their
organization. Every participant was assisted by the
researcher (the first author) to provide assistance if
needed. After the setup was complete, the researcher
asked the participants a series of open-ended questions
about their Yubico Security Key usage. We specifically
introduced the interview to ensure that participants were
aware of the critical functionality and benefits, as well
as ensure that they were able to remove the key from
their account if desired. Immediately after the interview
on the same day, the participants were provided with a
short survey to help us understand their risk perceptions
related to online identity security and their immediate
response to 2FA functionality and usage.
The 2FA security keys were given to the participants
as a token of appreciation for their participation. After
the study was complete and before participants left,
the primary researcher provided a walkthrough of how
2FA could be set up and integrated with other online




sent the participants a follow-up survey to ask about
their experiences with using or not using the keys with
their online accounts. The institution’s ethical review
board approved the study.
4.1. Analysis and Coding
Similar to the study by Rajivan et al. [30], we
calculated and generated the expertise calculation model
through factor analysis. We calculated precision scores
based on 30 replications done by Das et al. to
obtain the computer and security scores [40]. We
audio-recorded the interviews and the comments made
by the participants during the think-aloud process. All
of the recordings were transcribed by researchers and
stored in secure locations. We further analyzed the
transcripts through thematic coding [41, 42]. Three
coders trained in qualitative coding3 generated the
codebook. The codebook consisted of Halt Points,
Confusion Points, and Value Points.
Halt Points were noted when a participant got
stuck and required the intervention of the researcher.
Confusion Points occurred when a participant was
confused but did not require the researcher’s help to
move forward. We also noted several Value Points,
where participants provided direct feedback on the key
or its setup process, enabling us to provide actionable
recommendations for improved tool design. The coding
was implemented with the transcription of the data,
which had questions from the interview, the comments
made by the participants during the think-aloud process,
and observations noted by the primary researcher. Three
coders initially took a sample of three interviews and
coded them separately. The initial inter-coder reliability
(ICR) was 72%. The three coders met and discussed
the discrepancies and coded the same set of interviews
again to obtain an ICR score of 89% [43]. After that,
all researchers coded the interviews. If there was a
discrepancy, the code was the one with the majority
of votes (two out of three). If every coder coded
different codes, all of the points were noted (this did not
happen with the current data). Finally, we had another
round of discussions to go over the codes. If there
was a discrepancy that could not be agreed upon with
discussion, the primary researcher made the final call.
4.2. Limitations
We acknowledge that individuals can have different
experiences with different types of online accounts,
such as email and social media, which cannot be
generalized. However, we wanted to provide flexibility
to the participants, since online authentication is needed
for more than just email accounts, and some may not
want 2FA on their email. Additionally, a comparison of




can be addressed at the application level of the YubiKeys
to improve digital security.
5. Findings
We analyzed the qualitative data to understand
the detailed reasons for participants’ non-adoption or
negative perception of 2FA. We found that older
adults had several underlying reasons for choosing
to use or not use 2FA, such as technical expertise,
device incompatibility, misaligned mental models, and
online accounts not supporting 2FA. In our study,
all participants experienced challenges during the
installation procedure and required the assistance of the
researcher to move forward. Through our analysis, we
found that older adults are driven by the tangible benefits
that 2FA has to offer, such as increased protection
against credential theft. These benefits are often not
mentioned by 2FA tool developers or organizations that
make 2FA usage mandatory [44].
5.1. Participants’ Technical Expertise
Expertise is often a critical factor, especially when
we are analyzing users’ biases for choosing to adopt
(or not adopt) a tool. A majority of the participants
(nine out of ten) had no security experience, which was
why many participants had security scores of zero. The
one participant with some security experience took the
least amount of time (14 minutes) to set up the Yubico
security key and valued the benefits of using the security
tokens. When asked about the purpose of the key,
P1 said, “Prevent anybody else from getting into my
computer or accounts.”
Password Practices: To understand users’ online data
protection and authentication strategies, we focused
on the most common method of authentication, i.e.
passwords. We analyzed the password usage strategies
adopted by the older adult participants, which previous
research has shown differ considerably from those of
their younger counterparts [45] (shown in Figure 5.1).
Even for the participant who had some security
experience, their password practices did not adhere to
security standards. P1 said, “...I last changed my
password on July 2013...” (when prompted by Google
during the setup procedure).
The participants in our study often chose to write
down passwords to remember them. Similar traits
have been noted for many users who find it difficult to
remember passwords [46, 47]. One of the participants
used a password manager but still wrote down their
passwords in case they got locked out of their password
manager account. P7 mentions, “...And then password
manager, my husband and I share it. (We) write down
unique passwords. In case one of us would (have to)
navigate when one of us dies...”
The sharing of credentials between the family
members was also a common phenomena we found
amongst our participants. As P9 noted, “Oh, I may as
well. Doesn’t matter with this laptop. Nobody uses it
but me. When I die, my grandkids, my son-in-law will be
able to get in easier.”
On the other hand, one participant did acknowledge
that writing down passwords is a bad practice, but
their reasoning was more related to their fear of losing
the paper where the passwords were written rather
than any digital security threats. P3 mentions, “If I
wrote down the passwords, there’s a good chance I
may not remember where it’s written. I don’t like the
invasiveness of biometrics.”
Other participants found other methods of 2FA, such
as one-time passwords (OTPs), to be more helpful given
their prolonged usage. As P2 notes, “Security key might
make sense to use once I learn how. I have used both
verification codes sent by email and text occasionally. I
have never used Duo, but I think I have an idea what it
is. I have used security question a few times. I generally
avoid biometrics.”
Our results confirm that the password habits of
older adults do not reflect the habits seen in younger
adults [20]. We return to these password habits when
we discuss Security Caregivers in Section 6.
5.2. Registration Experience
Overall, every participant experienced difficulty
while registering the key and took an average of
52 minutes to complete the study. Our pilot study
with younger adults yielded results similar to those
of Das et al., where participants took around 10-15
minutes using a similar think-aloud protocol to complete
the study [12]. Nearly all participants (nine out
of ten) acknowledged that registering the key was a
complicated process, and P4 noted, “...I would have
given up long ago if I was not registering it with you
[The associated researcher]...”. Two of the participants
were extremely disappointed with the experience and
came back to the researchers to remove the keys from
their account out of fear of being locked out of them.
We noted several challenges participants encountered,
which included identifying the type of their security
token for setup and navigating to their account settings
to add the keys.
Seven participants noted they would use the YubiKey
to protect their bank account, six for their personal
email, five for their shopping account, four for their
work email, and six specified some other account. The
“Other Accounts” included brokerage and retirement
accounts, indicating the financial alignment of risks
with their online data security. However, four of the
participants thought their work email or personal email
were not worth protecting with the security keys. As
P5 mentioned, “Used with brokerage account. Gives
me peace of mind that brokerage account cannot be
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Figure 2. Password strategies adopted by participants. Extremely likely (left) indicates a strong intention to use
the particular authentication technique.
accessed without using security key. My other accounts
are less important, and they do not appear to have
capability to accept security key.” Sometimes, though
a participant was interested in protecting their financial
accounts, the technological limitation prevented the
addition of a 2FA to their accounts. As P1 notes: “...And
then it has all my others so I typically log in, lets say
to my X[bank name withheld] account by going to my
password bank, clicking on X, and it logs me in. I need
two-factor to protect my bank [account].”
Device Compatibility and Form Factor: Most
participants only had a tablet or a personal desktop;
they did not use a laptop for online browsing. The
YubiKey that we tested does not work with tablets
or smartphones. We provided information about
other YubiKeys, such as near-field communication
(NFC)-enabled YubiKeys, as well as security tokens
that are compatible with USB-C ports. The participants
mentioned that the USB-C port key has an extremely
small form factor, which would make it difficult for them
to use daily. Participants did not initially understand
how to use NFC-enabled devices; however, once the
process was explained to them, they acknowledged that
they would prefer to use those keys if the instructions
were better. They could then verify their identity
through a wireless connection instead of having to plug
a key into a USB port.
Facebook 2FA Issues: In the process of registering
the key for two-factor authentication, four participants
used 2FA for their Facebook accounts. They chose
Facebook because they did not have a Gmail, were
worried about getting locked out of their email, or
wanted their social media to be secure due to recent
data breaches. Facebook recently made it compulsory
for users to add their phone number to enable a second
factor of authentication. One participant refused to
provide their phone number to Facebook due to privacy
concerns. Another participant, P8, tried to receive
their verification code but did not receive anything after
repeated attempts due to a Facebook server error. They
said, “... I would have given up in[ sic] the third attempt
and returned the key to the seller. I might not be able to
login to my own account if Facebook does not allow me
to add the key in the first place...”
Browser Incompatibility: In addition to server issues
from the service’s perspective, we also found browser
incompatibility issues with the YubiKey. Yubico U2F
protocol-enabled keys only work for Google Chrome
version 38 or later or Opera version 40 or later. Five
out of the ten participants tried to use other browsers,
such as Safari, Mozilla Firefox, and Internet Explorer.
Thus, they believed that the key was not functioning
properly, and the researcher had to guide them to
the correct browser. Browser requirements were only
mentioned later in the instructions, which confused the
participants. P9 realized that they were using the wrong
browser: “Would you (thinking aloud and interacting
with Yubico) like me to use Chrome? I don’t know that.
I’ve got Firefox.”
Hidden and Unclear Instructions: Nine out of
ten participants expressed frustration with finding the
instructions on how to register the keys. Yubico
provides the link to the instruction in the cover of
the keys. Additionally, we provided the link to the
instructions as well, yet the participants found finding
the registration of the tool instructions difficult. Four
participants watched the videos on the Yubico website.
P7 mentioned that the video was helpful: “So should I
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watch the video?... So helpful.”
Four participants noted that the keys were useless if
they cannot even register them. The instructions seemed
verbose to the participants, who wanted a simpler
interface where they did not need to go back and forth
between instructions and account settings to register
the keys. P8 described their reaction: “Oh my God I
hate them (the instructions); they’re such a pain in the
backside.”
Yubico has designed their website to redirect
participants to Google and Facebook instructions based
on their preferred platform. The Yubico website also
refers to these accounts as “applications,” which was
an unfamiliar term to the participants. They requested a
clear, comprehensive understanding of the process and
wished to know what more about what they had to do.
In addition, when unexpected errors occurred, they were
unable to recover from them on their own and requested
further instructions. As P10 notes, they were confused
how to use the key in the first place: “First of all, I’m
not quite sure how I use the key. Just be anytime I go to
Facebook or while using Facebook I would insert this,
or do I need to activate it...”
Incorrect Settings: Six out of ten participants went
to their device settings or browser settings instead of
their account settings, again stemming from unclear
instructions. Two of the participants, who understood
that they needed to go to the account settings, could
not find the Facebook account settings in their profile
and required the researcher’s help. Participants found
this frustrating, and they wanted screenshots or app
assistance to guide them through the procedure without
making them read through the instructions.
Issues Using the YubiKey: Participants
demonstrated confusion when plugging the Yubico
key into the USB ports. The most frequent problem
was choosing when to plug in the key, as participants
inserted it before it was registered, and they did not
understand why the YubiKey was blinking. Participants
also experienced confusion when they were asked to
provide a name for their key (recall that Yubico expects
users to provide a pseudonym for their security tokens).
Additionally, participants were confused about the
correct orientation of the key due to its design, which
allows a key to be inserted upside down despite the
fact that it must be right-side up in order to function
correctly. The issue of orientation is inherently resolved
with USB-C YubiKeys because those can be inserted
either way. P3 questioned where the key was intended
to go: “Does it go there? I mean it looks thinner than a
regular USB...”
Some of the participants also did not understand
when to press the gold button 4 or why the lights were
4This gold button is actually a capacitance sensor which is required
by the user to touch when registering with or logging into a U2F site
blinking. P2 expressed confusion with this part: “It’s
blinking. Okay, so that sounds like it’s good. Press –
wait a minute if the key is blinking, light press the button
or gold disk. What the heck this? You’re supposed to
press that. Okay and then?”
5.3. Ongoing Experience
Within 30 days of completing, we distributed a
survey to the participants regarding their ongoing
experience of the 2FA tokens, which we gave as a
token of appreciation to the participants. Nine out
of ten participants responded to the follow-up survey
distributed a month later. Six had reported continued
using of the keys and two of them did not. P1
mentioned: “It doesn’t work with Ubuntu [a distribution
of the Linux operating system]. I do still have it and
if I log into a public computer, I will probably use
it.” P5 used the key for their brokerage account and
were particularly happy to see that their online data was
protected with an additional layer of security. They
mentioned: “Used with brokerage account. Gives
me peace of mind that brokerage account cannot be
accessed without using security key.”
One of the participants also met with the researchers
and said that they really liked how the keys are easy
to use. However, their registration process was hectic,
and they noted that if they were unable to install the
key, they would return it. This indicates that once the
initial hurdles are over, the participants could utilize
such security tools, and participants cared about their
online data and security; however, inaccessible tools
and technologies made that challenging. P10 described
their understanding of the device: “I’m not sure what it
does... I assume keep somebody from hacking into my
Facebook account... The more authentication required
the better. So once I could register the key... from
then on I have used that key to get into my Facebook
account.” P6 mentioned the lack of Yubico integration
with their service providers. Lack of instructions or
internal disagreements between the corporations were
another difficulty. They wrote: “I’m not regularly using
my Gmail account and haven’t been able to get people
to give me directions for using the YubiKey. Working on
it. How hard it is to use the YubiKey with PeoplePC”
(Note: PeoplePC is another ISP).
6. Discussion and Implications
Through our study of 2FA with older adults, we
identified several challenges with supporting older
adults’ digital independence by strengthening their
online account security. The 2FA registration process
was particularly challenging for participants, who took
an average of 52 minutes to complete the registration
process. This is considerably slower than prior work
were participants (students) took an average of 10
minutes to complete the task [12, 48]. They all required
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assistance from the primary researcher to proceed and
complete the process.
Our study found several interesting elements that
will enable easier and more user-friendly 2FA adoption
for older adults. Here, we address the Halt, Confusion,
and Value Points with recommendations by analyzing
the collected qualitative data and the surveys. When
the participants required the researchers’ assistance to
proceed further and were halted completely, we marked
it as Halt Points. Based on the transcription of the
think-aloud protocol, we also found Confusion Points
– various instances that did not prohibit the users
from proceeding further in the registration but created
confusion on how to use the keys. These negative
experiences are a possibility, and thus, can lead to future
rejection of the keys. During our analysis, we also found
some interesting Value Points, which helped us generate
recommendations to enhance the user experience and,
in turn, their security behavior. We make the following
recommendations to improve the user experience of 2FA
and address the security component by studying online
risk perspective.
6.1. Appropriate Assistance
Participants did not want to go back and forth
with the instructions and were often lost trying to
follow them. Appropriate assistance would provide
step-by-step instructions integrated with the task at
hand, rather than a wall of text one must return
to repeatedly to enroll. Colnago et al. described
users’ positive reception of personalized privacy and
security assistance when it comes to their technology
devices [49]. Such assistance would help far more
users than just older adults, illustrating that designing
for everyone has broader benefits for users beyond the
participants in our study. Similarly, the integration of
password management with the YubiKey is not obvious
during enrollment. One significant and immediate
benefit of the YubiKey is that it can generate and
store passwords. We did not ask our participants to
specifically use the password-management feature of the
YubiKeys; however, none of the participants inquired
about or seemed to be aware of this feature, even
though the instructions on the Yubico website mention
it. Once researchers performed a walkthrough of the
keys, participants confirmed their understanding of the
general benefits of using 2FA. They also acknowledged
that app-based authentication tools are dependent on
having a smartphone readily accessible. Participants
mentioned that they could use the keys without worrying
about their phones. Thus, providing an additional
2FA tool that is device-independent is beneficial for
users. However, the participants would have abandoned
enrollment without the research team.
6.2. Communicating Risks
Risk communication, which is critical to encourage
effective security practices, was missing [50]. Risk
perception is based on people’s instincts and the
information provided to them; it has a strong role in our
decision making process [51, 52]. Thus, for computer
security threats, we need to communicate the benefits
of 2FA adoption and the risk trade-offs of non-adoption
to users. If users cannot perceive the severity of their
inaction, they will not be aware of any existing security
vulnerabilities that can have adverse consequences [53].
Participants in our study understood in general terms
that email can be at risk, but they did not perceive that
theirs was, nor did they understand the risk implications
of a compromised email account at the beginning of
the experiment. Only after researchers explained to
participants how emails are used to reset other account
passwords, did they understand the technical risk. In
addition, participants did not experience or realize the
advantages of 2FA.
6.3. Confirmation of Registration
Adding a page that confirms the registration is
a simple design change, but it can be effective in
enhancing the user experience. After completing the
registration, the participants were not sure whether the
registration procedure was complete or not. Due to
the key’s form factor, they expected they could use the
safe removal of the device, as with USB flash memory
sticks. Also, Finkle et al. shows the importance
of confirmation of registration a way of users being
aware of the successful completion of the registration
operation [54]. Currently, not only is there no positive
feedback, there is no indication at all. Most of the
participants determined that they were required to log
out and log back in again to check if their key was
successfully registered. However, even this may be
inadequate; after initial enrollment, a machine might be
trusted (i.e., not require a 2FA login) either until it is
made explicitly untrusted or for some period of time.
6.4. Misalignment of Requirements
The YubiKey is an effective tool for protecting
software and network systems that have U2F
implementations [55]. However, some of the
responsibility for enhancing people’s security falls
on the shoulders of industry. Study participants showed
a strong preference for local Internet Service Providers
(ISPs) and the associated emails. Sadly, these smaller,
local ISPs have a low rate of U2F/FIDO key integration,
so the keys were not usable with their primary email
accounts – the accounts most in need of protection.
Participants indicated that their main security concerns
were their bank and brokerage accounts. P1 noted,
they were limited by the technological capability of
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their financial institution on adding 2FA to protect
their account. Similar to how participants used local
ISPs, participants also preferred local credit unions for
banking. All of the participants associated risks with
their financial accounts rather than their other online
accounts. Such tools should work with organizations,
such as banking institutions, retirement organizations,
and others, to enable 2FA.
6.5. Security Caregivers
In our study, older adults trusted the researcher to
assist them when they reached Halt Points. Just as
older adults need and trust caregivers for assistance with
instrumental activities of daily living [21, 56], assistance
with evolving tools and processes to assure online
security would help them stay secure and maintain
their digital independence. We introduce the role of
Security Caregivers and argue for future work to explore
the responsibilities, authorization, and limitations of
Security Caregivers. We envision Security Caregivers to
be less available than an IT helpdesk and much less
powerful than a person with the power of attorney. A
Security Caregiver would prioritize the best interests
of the older adult, be a recognized member of the
caregiving team, and have expertise in digital security.
The specific need for human Security Caregivers was
found in how participants valued human interaction
with the local phone company (see Section 6.4). In
addition, Security Caregivers would address recovery
requirements and provide back-ups, with assistance in
password management tools. The range of solutions
participants used to manage passwords illustrates that
this task places extra cognitive burden on people
(Section 5.1) (password creation and recall is not needed
with a YubiKey integrated with LastPass5). In addition,
Security Caregivers can address the chronic security
weakness of ‘security questions’, the answers to many
of which can be guessed from public information. This
would mitigate password loss and provide continuity of
access. With currently available technology, this can
be implemented with physical ownership of a back-up
YubiKey. Recall that a single account can be associated
with multiple keys, so this would address concerns about
account access loss and recovery. In technical terms,
we envision leveraging the integration of password
managers on YubiKeys, with two to five keys enrolled
as password managers but only the elders’ specific
hardware recognized by default. That is, if an additional
YubiKey is used there is notification sent to the user and
possibly other caregivers.
7. Future Work
As an extension of this work, we intend to apply
risk communication strategies (graphical and/or textual)
5https://www.lastpass.com/
to gauge their effectiveness on older adults’ risk
perceptions. We intend to extend this study through
a quantitative research approach. We will try to
understand the risk perception of older adults and then
test the efficacy of our proposed solutions, including
appropriate assistive design, age-friendly instructions,
and availability of Security Caregivers. Through
continued testing of design modifications, easy to
understand and regularly updated instructions, hands-on
assistance, and risk communication strategies, we aim
to ensure that aging adults will have an available
toolkit to maintain security, stay online, and stay
engaged. Additionally, we want to extend the study into
comparing different types of Yubico security tokens to
understand the effectiveness of the different models.
8. Conclusion
Older adults face evolving security risks to digital
independence through attacks such as phishing, identity
theft, and medical fraud [57, 58, 59]. As such,
researchers must develop user-friendly, fail-safe security
tools to support the aging population. We conducted a
think-aloud experiment with ten older adult participants
to investigate the usability of the YubiKey and address
a gap in research by focusing on older adults’ online
security. We found numerous challenges to the
successful use of 2FA by older adults: (1) they were
unable to install it, (2) they did not understand the
purpose or process, (3) the security tool did not fit their
needs, (4) their place of employment did not support the
tool and/or they did not receive 2FA training at work,
and (5) there is not currently a service or program that
assists with digital security for older adults. We have
provided actionable recommendations to address these
issues, including improving the form factor, creating
age-friendly instructions, informing institutions and
organizations serving older adults about the need for
2FA, and providing appropriate assistance to support
2FA installation and use. We introduce the concept of
Security Caregivers as a way to help older adults with
the adoption and use of evolving security tools to ensure
digital independence.
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